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Challenges associated with creating a pharmaceutical stockpile to
respond to a terrorist event
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The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) was called into action to develop a
National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPS). The NPS was created to respond to terrorism
events involving blast, chemical and biological agents. There are many challenges
associated with creating, managing and using such an asset. This paper provides a
helpful background for clinicians and those planning to develop pharmaceutical and/or
medical materiel stockpiles for national use. It also describes major challenges and offers
suggestions for meeting those challenges.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
The attack on the USA on 11 September 2001,
and the anthrax attacks in October 2001, marked
the debut of the US approach to addressing chal-
lenges associated with the mass use of antimicro-
bial agents in a terrorist event. The National
Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPS) Program, of the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), was called into action to respond to these
attacks.
On 11 September 2001, the State of New York
requested that the CDC send an NPS Program 12-h
Push Package to help in treating casualties with
trauma-related injuries who were expected to
overwhelm the hospital system in New York City.
A 12-h Push Package was built mainly for response
to biological and chemical terrorism. It is used
when the type of threat that an area is facing is
unclear. It is a 50-ton package of approximately
100 specialized cargo containers that include
antimicrobials and chemical antidotes as well as
medical/surgical supplies, airway management
equipment, fluids, and intravenous administration
supplies. All of the medical supplies were
expected to be of use in New York City.
Even though all air traffic and ground move-
ment had been suspended, under a previously
negotiated special agreement with the Federal
Aviation Administration, the CDC deployed a
12-h Push Package, which arrived by a combina-
tion of ground and air transport within 7 h of the
official request. A police escort ensured the smooth
transport of assets being moved by ground.
The CDC also responded to the anthrax attacks
that emerged in early October 2001. The NPS
Program delivered oral antimicrobials for post-
exposure prophylaxis to exposed mail handlers,
employees in Congressional office buildings, and
personnel from affected media organizations.
These antimicrobials came not from the NPS Pro-
gram 12-h Push Package, but from its Vendor
Managed Inventory (VMI), the second part of
the NPS Program. The VMI is a large inventory
of NPS product lines that can be tailored to the
emergent needs of an affected area. It is used for
dealing with an identified, known threat agent.
The NPS Program filled at least 80 VMI requests
for antimicrobials across the USA and delivered
them in an average of 5 h from receipt of the
request.
The concept of an NPS Program has made
apparent the many challenges associated with
the mass use of antimicrobial agents in a terrorist
event. We describe here the development of the
 2002 Copyright by the European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases
Corresponding author and reprint requests: S. Gorman,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton
Road, MS D-08, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA
Tel: þ404 639 0459
Fax: þ404 639 1527
E-mail: spg4@cdc.gov
NPS Program to address these challenges, and
how it has worked and been adapted in actual
terrorist attack conditions. This information may
be useful for other nations considering their own
response mechanisms.
C H A L L E N G E S 1 A N D 2 : E N L I S T I N G
P O L I T I C A L A N D F I S C A L S U P P O R T
F O R A S T O C K P I L E
The concept of a stockpile of antimicrobials and
other medical materiel requires substantial politi-
cal and fiscal support. In the USA, political support
for the NPS Program manifested in 1999 through
an authorization by the US Congress. Several
Members of Congress who were committed to
the idea of an NPS Program obtained an appro-
priation of $50 million to begin the program at the
CDC. Appropriations remained level at $52 mil-
lion annually for fiscal years 2000 and 2001. NPS
Program funding proposals for fiscal year 2002
have exceeded $600 million. Political support
was strong from the beginning. US officials had
had a resolute appreciation of the terrorist threat
for several years before it materialized, and recog-
nized that an NPS would be a national security
asset that would become particularly important if
and when a threat materialized.
C H A L L E N G E 3 : C E N T R A L I Z E D
V E R S U S D E C E N T R A L I Z E D
S T O C K P I L E S
One challenge was deciding whether to have a
centralized stockpile, decentralized stockpiles, or
some combination of both. US preparedness for
biological and chemical terrorism included the
promotion of both types of stockpile, but empha-
sized centralization. Support for decentralized
stockpiles, or those maintained in localities, has
been limited to small quantities of antidote for
chemical and nerve agent weapons. This is con-
sistent with the reality that saving lives after an
attack of chemicals or nerve agents requires hav-
ing antidote immediately available for administra-
tion. The NPS Program decided that the NPS
would be a stockpile of antimicrobials and anti-
dotes (for ongoing care of patients) that is centrally
operated as a resource to be made available
promptly to any locality in need. This provides
economies of scale in procurement, and efficien-
cies in oversight, while removing the burden from
each state or locality of creating and maintaining
this asset. The NPS Program thus became a part-
nership enterprise in which each state, in exchange
for access to the centrally operated stockpile,
develops plans and prepares to effectively manage
and use this asset if it ever needs to be deployed
there.
C H A L L E N G E 4 : E S T A B L I S H I N G
S T O C K P I L E R E Q U I R E M E N T S
Another challenge was to determine stockpile
‘requirements’ or the target number of persons
for which therapy and post-exposure prophyl-
axis should be amassed. Requirements were deter-
mined by the maximum numbers of persons
expected to be casualties in a particular type of
terrorist event [1]. This translated into the scope
and amounts of medical materiel that the stock-
pile should contain for treating and preventing
infections or other symptoms resulting from the
most likely threat agents. Equally important was
the determination of the ratio of intravenous
versus oral medications to be included in the
stockpile [2]. The NPS Program’s approach to
setting requirements was to consult with panels
of experts on the subject of biological and chemical
terrorism.
NPS Program antimicrobials and antidotes were
determined largely by published treatment recom-
mendations for the threat agents deemed to have
priority on the basis of their lethality, capacity for
weaponization, and ease of delivery [3–8]. Once
the priority threat agents were identified and the
projected casualties were predicted, these figures
became the initial requirements for the NPS Pro-
gram and formed its procurement objectives. Next,
the NPS Program delegated decision-making to
subject matter experts for certain ancillary pro-
ducts for the stockpile. These included: medical
and surgical items; supplies for intravenous
administration and airway management, and
other emergency medications, as well as equip-
ment for product cooling, oral drug repackaging,
and containerization of the stockpile itself.
C H A L L E N G E 5 : D E C I D I N G O N
T H E O R G A N I Z A T I O N O F T H E
S T O C K P I L E
A further challenge in creating a pharmaceutical
stockpile designed for response to a terrorist attack
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is the way in which the assets should be structured
in relation to likely terrorism scenarios. An initial
response to an attack would need a follow-on
response that adjusts for the scope and type of
attack as the realities of the attack become clear. An
initial response must also be prepared to deal with
simultaneous attacks that may occur some dis-
tance apart. The CDC addressed this problem by
designing the NPS around two tiers of response,
the 12-h Push Package and the VMI.
The initial response is called the 12-h Push
Package: ‘Push’, because an area needs only to
request help and the CDC will send a 50-ton
shipment of more than 100 specialized cargo con-
tainers that house a portion of each line item in the
NPS inventory. The CDC has built 12 of these 12-h
Push Packages and located them in 10 strategic
storage sites across the USA. This enables the CDC
to respond to simultaneous terrorist events,
regardless of their distance from one another.
Products are rotated in and out of the Push
Packages in order to ensure that in-date, fresh
product is available at all times.
The VMI is the second tier of the NPS. It consists
of a larger supply of most product lines in the 12-h
Push Packages. The manufacturers of the VMI
store these products for the NPS Program, and
rotate the items to maintain the longest possible
period of freshness. The VMI is designed for a
tailored response to a terrorist event, which could
range from providing huge quantities of a parti-
cular product in follow-on, to an event large
enough to call for a 12-h Push Package or, as in
the response to recent US anthrax attacks, to an
event too small to justify Push Package deploy-
ment. This structure has proven to be flexible and
has served the NPS Program well.
C H A L L E N G E 6 : D E T E R M I N I N G A
P R O C U R E M E N T P A R T N E R
Because the CDC is a public-health agency that
does not routinely engage in procuring antimicro-
bials, antidotes, and other medical materiel (except
for childhood vaccines), the CDC had only limited
experience and presence in the marketplace from
which to negotiate favorable costs for product. To
resolve these issues, the CDC partnered for pro-
curement with the National Acquisition Center
(NAC) of the US Department of Veterans’ Affairs.
The NAC annually purchases more than $3 billion
in medicines and medical materiel for the health-
care system for US veterans of military service.
This gives the NAC a solid relationship with
manufacturers and distributors and a powerful
marketplace position from which to negotiate such
issues as price, manufacturing priority, delivery
arrangements, and maximum product shelf life.
The fee that the CDC pays to the NAC for each
procurement is more than offset by cost savings
and the convenience of having procurement con-
ducted by an organization that specializes in the
field. Any organization managing a stockpile is
advised to seek a similar arrangement if it does not
possess a presence in the marketplace.
C H A L L E N G E 7 : D E T E R M I N I N G A
P R O D U C T M A N A G E M E N T
P A R T N E R
One of the most serious challenges for manage-
ment of a pharmaceutical stockpile is product
expiration date. This applies less often to medical
supplies than to pharmaceuticals, but these pro-
ducts tend to be the most costly and critical items
in a stockpile. The CDC partnered with the NAC’s
prime pharmaceutical distributor to rotate the
potency-dated products in the NPS. Products are
flagged for rotation approximately 12 months
before their expiration, traded for fresh product,
and sold to the distributor’s commercial custo-
mers. The NPS pays a restocking fee for this
service that is far below the cost of replacing the
expiring product. Certain chemical antidotes and
military-specific pharmaceutical devices are tested
for potency as they near their expiration date. If
these products pass a battery of tests, the US Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) may extend the
products’ shelf life under a special program admi-
nistered by the FDA. The manager of a pharma-
ceutical stockpile is advised to seek both types of
arrangement.
C H A L L E N G E 8 : D E T E R M I N I N G
S T O R A G E S I T E S / P A R T N E R S
A number of challenges exist in determining
appropriate storage for a stockpile. Storage sites
must be secured to prevent unauthorized access;
they must be protected from the elements (e.g.
water damage, rodent infestation); and they must
be environmentally controlled so that product will
not be exposed to temperature extremes. The CDC
also chose storage sites for its NPS Program 12-h
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Push Packages on the basis of transport considera-
tions. The CDC believed that it was important to
select sites from which its air and ground transport
partners could smoothly move these large
packages to points across the country within
12 hours of a federal decision to deploy the assets.
Both civilian and military storage locations can be
considered when determining storage partners.
C H A L L E N G E 9 : D E T E R M I N I N G
T R A N S P O R T P A R T N E R S
A centrally operated stockpile must be able to
move rapidly from its storage locations to any
affected site(s) in the country. This requires cargo
transport that has both dependable cargo handling
and reliable response times. The CDC partnered
with commercial transportation companies, with
the US military as a back-up. Although the military
may appear to be the preferred choice from the
standpoint of dependability, security, and trans-
portation of assets, its availability for performing
civilian functions during a war situation could
pose a problem. Defending the country in a time
of war is the primary mission of the US military,
and a terrorist act is considered an act of war.
The military could never give absolute deference
to the NPS Program, because a directive from the
National Command Authority could change its
mission.
The CDC partnered with two private cargo
transporters. These partnerships allow for trans-
portation by either air or ground. In selecting
transportation partners, other countries should
consider the transportation assets of their military
force and the extent to which these assets could be
firmly committed to transporting the stockpile
during a major threat to the health and safety of
its people. Where this cannot be ensured, the use of
commercial transportation partners as the primary
source may be prudent to consider.
C H A L L E N G E 1 0 : D E V I S I N G A
S T R A T E G Y F O R P R E P A R I N G
U N I T - O F - U S E O R A L P R O P H Y L A X I S
The consensus of experts is that the vast majority
of persons exposed in a biological terrorist attack
will require post-exposure prophylaxis rather than
therapeutic treatment for symptomatic disease.
Unit-of-use packaging is common in many parts
of the world but is still a novelty in the USA. Bulk
bottles of 100 or 500 tablets of various antimicro-
bials are the most marketable versions of these
products in the USA, but the antimicrobials must
be converted to unit-of-use form before they can be
dispensed to individuals. The CDC has acquired
tools for repackaging bulk tablets, including the
use of industrial packaging machines, pill-count-
ing machines, and volumetric devices for filling
prescriptions by hand. To rapidly distribute anti-
microbials to affected individuals, the CDC
recently turned to advance repackaging of bulk
product into unit-of-use form (i.e. 10-day or 25-day
regimens) through firms licensed by the FDA to
repackage antimicrobials under conditions that
allow them to retain their original expiration dates.
This keeps maximum product shelf life while
saving time in distributing antimicrobials to indi-
viduals. It also emphasizes the need for local-level
planning to move oral prophylaxis to points of
distribution and the need for efficient operation of
those points of distribution.
C H A L L E N G E 1 1 : E N S U R I N G
E F F E C T I V E M A N A G E M E N T A N D
U S E I N A D E P L O Y M E N T
A challenge for any stockpile program, especially
one that is operated centrally, is ensuring that
its assets will be effectively managed and used
when they are needed. A centrally operated stock-
pile could be designed to deploy with enough
personnel to repackage, move and distribute anti-
microbials and antidotes to the exposed popula-
tion. This could be a function of how public health
is administered and whether a local infrastruc-
ture exists upon which to build a process for
response. Because public health in the USA is a
shared responsibility, the CDC is developing part-
nerships with all states to help them plan and
prepare to effectively manage and use the NPS
in the event that the NPS is deployed to their states.
The CDC NPS Program has engaged in an active
campaign of education and technical assistance to
develop such plans and preparations. In the event
of deployment of the NPS, NPS Program staff
will meet the shipment, and help state and local
public-health and emergency response workers
to rapidly set up and transport NPS Program
assets to their intended locations. Regardless of
the national infrastructure for moving and dis-
tributing a deployed pharmaceutical stockpile,
having these components in place is as vital as
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having fresh antimicrobials for mass prophylaxis
or treatment.
C O N C L U S I O N : E X P E C T I N G T H E
U N E X P E C T E D
In conclusion, there are many challenges asso-
ciated with the creation and use of a pharmaceu-
tical stockpile. This paper has attempted to present
the major challenges encountered in this process.
One final challenge for a stockpile program is the
need to prepare for the unexpected. For this rea-
son, the CDC has built redundancy into many
aspects of the NPS Program. Examples include
creation of multiple 12-h Push Packages, using
multiple manufacturers of product wherever pos-
sible, having multiple transport partners, and hav-
ing multiple methods of supplying unit-of-use
antimicrobials. It is prudent for stockpile designers
and operators to build in redundancy wherever
possible. This is particularly important with mis-
sion-critical components, so as not to compromise
readiness when a terrorist event occurs.
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